The Venezuela Crisis: Side Effects for China, Hong Kong & The Global Stage

Mandarin Time
2 days ago
16 min read

Executive Summary

On January 3, 2026, the United States launched Operation Absolute Resolve, a military strike on Venezuela that captured President Nicolas Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores. This dramatic action has sent shockwaves through global markets and geopolitics, but perhaps no country outside Latin America faces greater consequences than China.

Beijing has invested over $105 billion in loans and financial assistance to Venezuela since 2007, making it China's largest sovereign debtor worldwide. With the US now asserting control over Venezuela's oil industry and announcing plans to redirect crude flows, China faces potential losses of billions in outstanding debt, disrupted oil supplies representing 5% of its imports, and a humiliating setback to its Belt and Road Initiative in the Western Hemisphere.

This report examines the full scope of Chinese investments in Venezuela, the immediate and long-term consequences of Maduro's capture, implications for Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the broader Asia-Pacific region, and the possible outcomes that could reshape great power competition for decades to come.

1. Two Decades of Chinese Investment in Venezuela

1.1 The Oil-for-Loans Framework (2007-2016)

The China-Venezuela financial relationship represents one of the most ambitious and ultimately problematic sovereign lending experiments in modern history. Beginning under Hugo Chavez and continuing under Nicolas Maduro, China extended unprecedented credit to Venezuela through an innovative but risky oil-backed lending mechanism.

Year	Loan Amount	Cumulative Total
2006	$2 billion	$2 billion
2007	$7 billion	$9 billion
2008-2009	$12 billion	$21 billion
2010	$27 billion	$48 billion
2011-2016	$14.5 billion	$62.5 billion

The China-Venezuela Joint Fund (CVJF), established in 2007, operated as a pre-paid oil sale mechanism. The China Development Bank (CDB) provided advance financing, with repayment structured through direct crude oil shipments at negotiated prices. This created an alternative to conventional petrodollar financing systems and provided operational continuity when international sanctions restricted Venezuela's access to global banking networks.

1.2 Total Chinese Exposure

According to AidData research, Venezuela's total debt to China peaked at approximately $105.6 billion around 2016, making it one of the largest debtors to Beijing globally. This includes:

$62.5 billion in direct loans through 17 different loan contracts via CDB
Approximately half of all Chinese loans committed to Latin America
Over 200 infrastructure projects funded by Chinese capital
$3.2 billion in Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI)

$615 million in military equipment sales over the past decade

1.3 Strategic Investments Beyond Oil

Chinese engagement in Venezuela extended far beyond petroleum:

Telecommunications

Huawei Technologies: $250 million contract (2004) to improve fiber optic infrastructure
ZTE: Developed the Homeland Card national ID system
Central to Venezuela's 4G network infrastruct

Mining & Resources

CITIC Group: Mining contracts for iron, gold, bauxite, and thorium (2012)
Stakes in Corporacion Venezolana de Guayana, state-owned metals conglomerate
Access to rare earth minerals critical for EV and technology sectors

Oil Sector Joint Ventures

Company	Joint Venture	Reserves (barrels)	Status
CNPC	PetroSinovensa	1.6 billion	Active
Sinopec	Multiple	2.8 billion	Active
China Concord	2 oilfields	$1B investment	At risk

2. What Happens Now: The Immediate Aftermath

2.1 Operation Absolute Resolve

The US military operation on January 3, 2026 fundamentally altered the China-Venezuela relationship:

150+ aircraft launched from 20 airbases across the Western Hemisphere
Approximately 200 US special forces participated in the extraction
Venezuelan air defenses suppressed; infrastructure across northern Venezuela struck
Maduro and wife captured at Fuerte Tiuna military complex in Caracas
Both transported to USS Iwo Jima, then to New York for arraignment
32 Cuban military personnel killed during the operation
Vice President Delcy Rodriguez sworn in as interim president

2.2 China's Immediate Response

Beijing's reaction was swift but notably constrained:

Foreign Ministry condemned US "hegemonic acts" violating international law
Called operation "deeply shocking" - unusually strong language signaling genuine unease
Demanded immediate release of Maduro and his wife
Joined Russia and Colombia in requesting UN Security Council emergency meeting
No military response, no naval vessels dispatched, no economic sanctions threatened

Critically, just hours before the US strike, Maduro had met with Chinese Special Envoy Qiu Xiaoqi, reaffirming the "unbreakable nature of the brotherhood" between the two countries. The timing of this meeting - and Beijing's subsequent inability to protect its ally - represents a significant loss of face for Xi Jinping.

2.3 Impact on Chinese Oil Imports

Metric	Value
Venezuelan share of China's oil imports	5% (approximately)
Average Venezuelan exports to China	300,000-470,000 barrels/day
Peak monthly share (Nov 2025)	81.7% of Venezuelan exports
Primary Chinese buyers	Independent "teapot" refiners in Shandong
Alternative suppliers if displaced	Russia, Middle East

While Venezuelan oil represents only 5% of China's total imports, the preferential pricing and debt-repayment mechanism made it strategically valuable. Trump has indicated Venezuela may continue selling to China but at market prices and reduced volumes - eliminating Beijing's privileged position.

3. Possible Outcomes: Four Scenarios

Scenario 1: Negotiated Accommodation

The US and China reach a pragmatic arrangement where Chinese companies retain limited presence in Venezuela's oil sector in exchange for Beijing's tacit acceptance of the new political order.

Chinese joint ventures (PetroSinovensa, Sinopec projects) continue operating
Debt repayment restructured under new Venezuelan government
China accepts reduced oil allocations at market prices
Beijing limits diplomatic criticism to preserve broader US-China relationship
Belt and Road activities in Latin America continue elsewhere

Scenario 2: Complete Chinese Displacement

US oil companies fully take over Venezuela's petroleum sector, Chinese investments are nationalized or voided, and Beijing suffers a total loss.

US declares Chinese contracts "unconstitutional" or illegitimate
ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, Chevron dominate reconstruction
China loses $10-17 billion in outstanding debt
Oil supplies redirected entirely to US and allies
Major setback to Belt and Road credibility globally

Scenario 3: Prolonged Instability

Venezuela remains unstable with no clear resolution, creating a "quagmire" that damages both US and Chinese interests.

Chavista resistance and insurgency destabilize the country
Oil infrastructure deterioration continues; production remains below 1M bpd
Neither US nor Chinese companies willing to invest in uncertain environment
Refugee crisis intensifies, affecting Colombia and Brazil
All parties lose; status quo paralysis

Scenario 4: Strategic Realignment

China responds by dramatically accelerating engagement elsewhere in Latin America and the developing world, turning the Venezuela loss into broader strategic momentum.

Massive new investments in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico
Accelerated BRI infrastructure projects across CELAC nations
Venezuela becomes rallying point for anti-US sentiment globally
Beijing positions itself as defender of international law and sovereignty
Long-term influence grows despite short-term setback

4. Effects on Hong Kong

4.1 Direct Financial Exposure

Hong Kong faces immediate consequences from the Venezuela crisis:

Three Hong Kong-based companies sanctioned by US Treasury (Dec 2025): Aries Global Investment Ltd., Krape Myrtle Co., Winky International Ltd.
One vessel (Rosalind) owned by Hong Kong-registered Winky International sanctioned
Chinese oil ODI often routed through Hong Kong to undisclosed final destinations
Hong Kong Stock Exchange energy stocks (PetroChina -3.52%, CNOOC -3.29%) fell on news

The sanctioning of Hong Kong shell companies involved in Venezuelan oil trade exposes the territory's role in facilitating China's overseas investments - potentially attracting further US scrutiny.

4.2 Geopolitical Signaling

The Venezuela operation carries profound implications for Hong Kong's security environment:

Demonstrates US willingness to use military force against perceived threats in its sphere
Chinese social media draws direct parallels to potential Taiwan scenarios
Hong Kong academic Mei Yang argues US may reduce "interference in East Asian affairs"
Alternative view: US demonstrating strength may deter Chinese adventurism
Hong Kong's "one country, two systems" status increasingly viewed through great power lens

The Trump administration's stated "Monroe Doctrine 2.0" explicitly aims to counter Chinese influence in the Western Hemisphere. This could have spillover effects on US policy toward Hong Kong, particularly regarding financial sector access and technology transfers.

4.3 Panama Canal Connection

The Venezuela crisis is linked to broader US pressure on Chinese assets near strategic chokepoints:

• Trump administration campaigning to oust Hong Kong developer from Panama Canal ports

• CK Hutchison Holdings (Hong Kong) operates ports at both canal entrances

• US claims this means China is "operating" the canal

• Honduras under US pressure severed diplomatic ties with China, recognized Taiwan

• Pattern of targeting Hong Kong-linked entities in Latin America

5. Implications on the Global Stage

5.1 Taiwan Question

The Venezuela operation has ignited fierce debate about implications for Taiwan:

Arguments It Emboldens China:

Sets precedent for great power intervention in "spheres of influence"
Chinese social media hails it as "blueprint" for Taiwan takeover
650+ million impressions on Weibo discussing Taiwan parallels
Some argue US has lost moral authority to oppose similar Chinese actions

Arguments It Does Not Change Calculations:

China has not refrained from Taiwan action due to lack of "precedent"
Taiwan is fundamentally different - democratic, economically integrated, US-armed
Military capabilities, not legal justification, drive Beijing's timeline
Taiwan lawmaker Wang Ting-yu: "China is not the US, and Taiwan is not Venezuela"
Council on Foreign Relations assessment: "little impact on Xi Jinping's calculations"

5.2 Belt and Road Initiative Vulnerability

Venezuela exposes critical weaknesses in China's global investment strategy:

22 Latin American countries participate in BRI - all now face increased risk
Economic investments cannot substitute for military capacity
China's $60+ billion in Venezuela loans produced minimal strategic leverage
December 2025 China Policy Paper on Latin America now appears aspirational
CELAC cooperation and "China-CELAC Community of Common Destiny" face setbacks

5.3 Sino-Russian Relations

The Venezuela capture has complex implications for the Beijing-Moscow axis:

Potential Strengthening:

Shared perception of acute US threat may tighten alliance
Increased Russian oil sales to China to replace Venezuelan supplies
Joint diplomatic opposition at UN and other forums

Potential Strains:

Chinese netizen commentary: Russia waged 4-year war in Ukraine; US solved Venezuela in one hour
Reinforces Chinese view of Russia as "junior partner"
Questions about Russian reliability as security guarantor
Venezuela was BRICS partner; its loss diminishes bloc's credibility

5.4 New World Order Dynamics

Actor	Position	Implications
United States	"Monroe Doctrine 2.0"	Asserting hemispheric dominance
China	"Defender of sovereignty"	Rhetorical position; limited action
Russia	Condemns but cannot act	Exposed as unable to project power
Latin America Left	Brazil, Mexico condemn	Regional tensions heightened
Latin America Right	Argentina, Peru praise	Potential US realignment
Europe	Divided; France alarmed	Questions about US precedent

6. Conclusion: A Watershed Moment

The capture of Nicolas Maduro represents far more than the fall of a single authoritarian leader. It marks a potential inflection point in great power competition, exposing the limits of Chinese economic statecraft when confronted with American military power.

Key Takeaways

China has lost its largest sovereign debtor and a cornerstone of its Latin American strategy
$10-17 billion in outstanding debt may never be repaid under new terms
Belt and Road investments proven vulnerable to US military intervention
Hong Kong-registered entities face increased sanctions risk
Taiwan implications debated, but military calculus unchanged
Xi Jinping personally invested in Maduro relationship since 2013; significant loss of face

What to Watch

Friday White House meeting between Trump and oil executives (Exxon, ConocoPhillips, Chevron)
Chinese response to any seizure of joint venture assets
Venezuelan debt restructuring negotiations
Stability of Rodriguez interim government
Next moves in US "Monroe Doctrine 2.0" - Panama, Greenland, broader region
Chinese military exercises around Taiwan in coming weeks

As one Chinese internet commentator observed: "Russia waged a four-year war to resolve the Ukraine problem, and the war is still ongoing. To resolve the Venezuelan problem, the US needed just one hour." Whether Beijing views Venezuela as a warning to be more cautious or as permission to assert its own regional sphere remains the central question of 2026 geopolitics.

Sources & References

News & Analysis:

• Washington Post - China condemns U.S. strike

• CNN - Maduro's capture is a blow to China

• CNBC - China response to Venezuela strike

• Foreign Policy - What Maduro's Capture Means for China

• South China Morning Post - China's investors prep for anxiety

Research & Think Tanks:

• Columbia CGEP - Venezuela-China Oil Ties

• Council on Foreign Relations - Trump's Strikes Will Not Embolden China

• ODI - Trump's Monroe Doctrine 2.0

• ICDS - Will China shed tears over Maduro?

• The People's Map of Global China - Venezuela

Data Sources:

• AidData - Chinese Lending Database

• Inter-American Dialogue - China-Latin America Finance

• Wikipedia - 2026 United States strikes in Venezuela

• Wikipedia - China-Venezuela relations

委内瑞拉危机：

对中国、香港及全球格局的连锁效应

投资损失、地缘政治影响与可能结果 | 2026年1月

执行摘要

2026年1月3日，美国发动「绝对决心行动」，对委内瑞拉实施军事打击，俘获了总统尼古拉斯·马杜罗及其妻子西莉亚·弗洛雷斯。这一戏剧性行动在全球市场和地缘政治中引发了冲击波，但在拉丁美洲以外，或许没有哪个国家比中国面临更大的后果。

自2007年以来，北京已向委内瑞拉提供了超过1056亿美元的贷款和财政援助，使其成为中国全球最大的主权债务国。随着美国宣布控制委内瑞拉石油工业并计划重新分配原油流向，中国面临着数十亿美元未偿债务的潜在损失、占其进口量5%的石油供应中断，以及其在西半球「一带一路」倡议遭受的羞辱性挫折。

本报告全面审视了中国在委内瑞拉的投资规模、马杜罗被俘的即时和长期后果、对香港、台湾和更广泛亚太地区的影响，以及可能重塑大国竞争数十年的各种结果。

一、中国对委内瑞拉二十年的投资

1.1 石油换贷款框架（2007-2016年）

中委金融关系代表了现代史上最雄心勃勃、但最终问题重重的主权贷款实验之一。从乌戈·查韦斯开始，延续到尼古拉斯·马杜罗执政期间，中国通过创新但高风险的石油担保贷款机制向委内瑞拉提供了史无前例的信贷。

年份	贷款金额	累计总额
2006年	20亿美元	20亿美元
2007年	70亿美元	90亿美元
2008-2009年	120亿美元	210亿美元
2010年	270亿美元	480亿美元
2011-2016年	145亿美元	625亿美元

2007年成立的中委联合基金（CVJF）作为预付石油销售机制运作。中国国家开发银行（CDB）提供预付融资，还款通过按协商价格直接运送原油来进行。这创造了传统石油美元融资体系的替代方案，并在国际制裁限制委内瑞拉进入全球银行网络时提供了运营的连续性。

1.2 中国的总体敞口

根据AidData的研究，委内瑞拉对中国的总债务在2016年前后达到约1056亿美元的峰值，使其成为全球对北京负债最多的国家之一。这包括：

通过国开行17份不同贷款合同提供的625亿美元直接贷款
约占中国对拉丁美洲贷款承诺总额的一半
超过200个由中国资本资助的基础设施项目
32亿美元的中国对外直接投资（OFDI）
过去十年6.15亿美元的军事装备销售

目前未偿债务估计在100至170亿美元之间，因为委内瑞拉已通过石油运输偿还了大部分债务。然而，还款问题始于2016年，此后中国没有向委内瑞拉金融机构发放任何新贷款。

1.3 石油以外的战略投资

中国在委内瑞拉的参与远不止石油：

电信

华为技术：2.5亿美元合同（2004年）用于改善光纤基础设施
中兴：开发了「祖国卡」国民身份证系统
委内瑞拉4G网络基础设施的核心

采矿与资源

中信集团：铁矿、黄金、铝土矿和钍的采矿合同（2012年）
在国有金属企业委内瑞拉圭亚那公司持有股份
获取对电动汽车和技术行业至关重要的稀土矿物

石油行业合资企业

公司	合资企业	储量（桶）	状态
中石油	中委石油	16亿	运营中
中石化	多个项目	28亿	运营中
中国康科德	2个油田	10亿美元投资	面临风险

二、当前局势：直接后果

2.1 绝对决心行动

2026年1月3日的美国军事行动从根本上改变了中委关系：

150多架飞机从西半球20个空军基地起飞
约200名美国特种部队参与了行动
委内瑞拉防空系统被压制；委内瑞拉北部基础设施遭到打击
马杜罗夫妇在加拉加斯的富尔特蒂乌纳军事基地被俘
两人被送往硫磺岛号两栖攻击舰，然后转运至纽约接受提审
32名古巴军事人员在行动中丧生
副总统德尔西·罗德里格斯宣誓就任临时总统

2.2 中国的即时反应

北京的反应迅速但明显克制：

外交部谴责美国违反国际法的「霸权行为」
称此次行动「深感震惊」——异常强烈的措辞表明真正的不安
要求立即释放马杜罗及其妻子
与俄罗斯和哥伦比亚一起要求召开联合国安理会紧急会议
没有军事回应、没有派遣军舰、没有威胁经济制裁

关键的是，就在美国发动打击前几小时，马杜罗刚刚会见了中国拉丁美洲事务特别代表邱小琪，重申两国之间「牢不可破的兄弟情谊」。这次会面的时机——以及北京随后无力保护其盟友——对习近平来说是一次重大的颜面损失。

2.3 对中国石油进口的影响

指标	数值
委内瑞拉占中国石油进口份额	约5%
委内瑞拉对华出口均值	30-47万桶/日
峰值月份份额（2025年11月）	委内瑞拉出口的81.7%
主要中国买家	山东独立「茶壶」炼油厂
如被取代的替代供应商	俄罗斯、中东

虽然委内瑞拉石油仅占中国总进口量的5%，但优惠定价和债务偿还机制使其具有战略价值。特朗普表示委内瑞拉可能继续向中国销售石油，但将以市场价格和减少的数量进行——这将消除北京的特权地位。

三、可能结果：四种情景

情景一：协商妥协

美中达成务实安排，中国公司在委内瑞拉石油行业保留有限存在，以换取北京对新政治秩序的默认接受。

中国合资企业（中委石油、中石化项目）继续运营
在新的委内瑞拉政府下重组债务偿还
中国接受以市场价格减少的石油配额
北京限制外交批评以维护更广泛的中美关系
一带一路活动在拉丁美洲其他地方继续

情景二：中国完全出局

美国石油公司完全接管委内瑞拉石油行业，中国投资被国有化或作废，北京遭受全面损失。

美国宣布中国合同「违宪」或不合法
埃克森美孚、康菲石油、雪佛龙主导重建
中国损失100-170亿美元未偿债务
石油供应完全转向美国及其盟友
一带一路信誉在全球遭受重大挫折

情景三：长期不稳定

委内瑞拉持续不稳定，没有明确解决方案，形成损害美中双方利益的「泥潭」。

查韦斯主义抵抗和叛乱使国家不稳定
石油基础设施持续恶化；产量保持在每天100万桶以下
美中公司都不愿在不确定环境中投资
难民危机加剧，影响哥伦比亚和巴西
各方皆输；现状僵局

情景四：战略重新调整

中国通过大幅加速在拉丁美洲和发展中世界其他地区的参与来回应，将委内瑞拉的损失转化为更广泛的战略动力。

在巴西、阿根廷、智利、墨西哥进行大规模新投资
加速拉美和加勒比国家共同体各国的一带一路基础设施项目
委内瑞拉成为全球反美情绪的集结点
北京将自己定位为国际法和主权的捍卫者
尽管短期受挫，长期影响力增长

四、对香港的影响

4.1 直接金融敞口

香港面临委内瑞拉危机的直接后果：

三家香港公司被美国财政部制裁（2025年12月）：Aries Global Investment Ltd.、Krape Myrtle Co.、Winky International Ltd.
一艘船舶（Rosalind）由香港注册的Winky International拥有，被列入制裁名单
中国石油对外直接投资常常通过香港流向未披露的最终目的地
香港股市能源股下跌（中石油-3.52%，中海油-3.29%）

制裁参与委内瑞拉石油贸易的香港空壳公司，暴露了香港在促进中国海外投资中的角色——可能引来更多美国审查。

4.2 地缘政治信号

委内瑞拉行动对香港安全环境具有深远影响：

表明美国愿意在其势力范围内对威胁使用武力
中国社交媒体直接将其与潜在的台湾情景相提并论
香港学者梅扬认为美国可能减少「对东亚事务的过度干预」
另一观点：美国展示实力可能遏制中国的冒险主义
香港「一国两制」地位越来越多地从大国博弈视角审视

特朗普政府宣称的「门罗主义2.0」明确旨在抵制中国在西半球的影响力。这可能对美国的香港政策产生溢出效应，特别是在金融行业准入和技术转让方面。

4.3 巴拿马运河关联

委内瑞拉危机与美国对战略要道附近中国资产施压的更广泛行动相关联：

特朗普政府正在推动将香港开发商从巴拿马运河港口驱逐
长江和记实业（香港）运营运河两端的港口
美国声称这意味着中国在「运营」运河
洪都拉斯在美国压力下与中国断交，承认台湾
在拉丁美洲针对香港关联实体的模式

五、对全球格局的影响

5.1 台湾问题

委内瑞拉行动引发了关于台湾影响的激烈辩论：

认为将鼓励中国的观点：

为大国在「势力范围」内干预开创先例
中国社交媒体将其誉为台湾接管的「蓝图」
微博上讨论台湾类比的话题获得超过6.5亿次浏览
有人认为美国已失去反对中国类似行动的道德权威

认为不会改变算计的观点：

中国没有因为缺乏「先例」而克制对台行动
台湾有根本不同——民主、经济整合、美国武装
军事能力而非法律依据决定北京的时间表
台湾立法委员王定宇：「中国不是美国，台湾不是委内瑞拉」
美国外交关系委员会评估：「对习近平的算计影响甚微」

5.2 一带一路倡议的脆弱性

委内瑞拉暴露了中国全球投资战略的关键弱点：

22个拉丁美洲国家参与一带一路——现在都面临更大风险
经济投资无法替代军事能力
中国在委内瑞拉600多亿美元的贷款几乎没有产生战略杠杆
2025年12月中国拉丁美洲政策文件现在显得是空想
拉美和加勒比国家共同体合作及「中拉命运共同体」面临挫折

5.3 中俄关系

马杜罗被俘对中俄轴心有复杂影响：

可能加强：

对美国威胁的共同感知可能使联盟更紧密
增加俄罗斯对华石油销售以替代委内瑞拉供应
在联合国和其他论坛联合进行外交反对

可能产生裂痕：

中国网民评论：俄罗斯打了四年乌克兰战争仍未结束；美国一小时解决委内瑞拉问题
强化中国视俄罗斯为「小伙伴」的看法
对俄罗斯作为安全保障者可靠性的质疑
委内瑞拉是金砖国家伙伴；其损失削弱了该集团的信誉

5.4 新世界秩序动态

行为体	立场	影响
美国	「门罗主义2.0」	维护半球主导地位
中国	「主权捍卫者」	言辞立场；行动有限
俄罗斯	谴责但无力行动	暴露无法投射力量
拉美左翼	巴西、墨西哥谴责	地区紧张加剧
拉美右翼	阿根廷、秘鲁赞扬	潜在美国重新调整
欧洲	分裂；法国担忧	对美国先例的质疑